The language of balancing and proportionality figures increasingly, often in judicial and academic constitutional legal reasoning in Western democracies. The spread of this particular form of discourse raises important methodological and substantive issues for scholars of comparative law. While the dominant narrative in the relevant lines of scholarship has long been one of similarity and convergence, this article argues that not enough attention has been paid to the possibility of difference-the idea that references to balancing might mean very different things in different settings. In Parts I and II, the article suggests that a methodological shift-from a focus on balancing as doctrine to a focus on balancing as legal argument-will be necessary to bring out these different meanings. Based on a case study of early and mid-twentieth century practices in Germany and the United States, it is argued that one crucial difference in the local meanings of balancing in these settings relates to the extent to which choices of legal form are locally expected to have inherent substantive implications (Parts III and IV).
INTRODUCTION: BALANCING AND THE POSSIBILITY OF DIFFERENCE
Balancing and proportionality are rapidly developing into central topics of, as well as crucial tools for, the comparative study of constitutional law. Within these studies, the themes of balancing and proportionality generally figure in two principal ways. First, comparativists have seized on a torrent of similar-sounding judicial and academic language-of "balancing," "weighing" and "proportionality"-as evidence of a "globalization of constitutional law."
1 In this literature, the spread of references to balancing is seen as a clear indication of converging legal orders, of the development of a "generic form of constitutional law," or even of the gradual manifestation of an underlying universal, "ultimate rule of law." Second, scholars have turned to balancing to express not only similarities between legal orders and cultures, but also salient differences. In this vein, commentators have argued, for example, that differences between freedom of expression adjudication between the U.S. on the one hand and Europe and Canada on the other can be captured, to a significant degree, in the difference between a rule-oriented model and an openended balancing approach. 2 Situated in between these two strands, lies an exciting third possibility that has so far largely escaped sustained academic attention: the idea that balancing itself might mean different things in different times and places. 3 The language of (2008) . Some commentators have recently claimed that "balancing" and "proportionality," while similar in terms of conceptual structure are "situated" in very different ways in different legal cultures, due to differences in "context." See, e.g., Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 1, at 372. While this acknowledgment of the importance of context is highly significant, this Article aims to go further by exploring the potentially radically different meanings (identical) language of balancing or of proportionality may have in different settings.
constitutional balancing, in this view, becomes a central locus for a complex interplay of relevant similarities and differences in constitutional architectures and attitudes. A primary task for comparative constitutional lawyers, in this third perspective, would be to try to come to grips with the "local meaning" of this discourse of balancing. 4 Such a search clearly is not easy, as it has traditionally been assumed, unquestioningly, and virtually immediately from the first references to balancing in late nineteenth and early twentieth century case-law and literature, that the language of balancing had to mean more or less the same, wherever it was used. 5 This Article is part of a larger project that tries to supplement this pervasive tradition in comparative constitutional law scholarship by engaging directly with this intriguing possibility of difference. Specifically, it aims to do two things:
First, in Part I, below, I propose a methodological shift in focus from balancing as "method," "doctrine," or "process" to balancing as discourse. Looking at balancing, not as a specific doctrine signaled by a particular form of language, but as a form of language that may signal a particular doctrinal test, but also a broad constitutional principle, or a theoretical model of a particular constitutional right, or a theory of adjudication, or any of the myriad other phenomena known within legal cultures, should make it possible to come to a much more precise understanding of what it is exactly that balancing means within a foreign legal order. 6 Second, in Parts II and III, the Article offers a closer look at two phases in the development of balancing discourse in two particular jurisdictions, Germany and the U.S., in the course of the twentieth century. Applying the discourse-oriented method set out earlier, these historical investigations focus on balancing's role as legal argument. They build on the assumption that preceding layers of meaning will continue to influence this argument's current significance. In both Parts, the Article aims to supplement the important historical analysis recently offered by Cohen-Eliya and Porat, in particular by placing more emphasis on developments in Germany. 7 Part II contrasts the discourse of balancing in the German "Jurisprudence of Interests" with that of the American "Sociological Jurisprudence" in the 1920s and 1930s. Part III, finally, looks at perceptions of balancing in 1950s and 1960s German and American free speech law.
The main emphasis of this Article is on showing how a genealogical perspective focused on balancing as discourse may offer new insights into a balancing and proportionality as central features of contemporary constitutional law theory and practice. Given this emphasis on issues of comparative method, some of the substantive results of applying this method can only be sketched in preliminary form within the context of this Article. Nevertheless, one conclusion may be formulated in advance.
It is argued that a central element of difference between German and American (United States) discourses of balancing lies in the extent to which local actors perceive balancing to have inherent political characteristics. While German theorists of the 1930s introduced balancing as a "pure theory of method," their American contemporaries were interested in using balancing to promote a new worldview and a new conception of justice. Similarly, while American constitutional lawyers of the 1950s and 1960s were concerned with the balancing's impact on levels of rights protection and the institutional stature of courts, German commentators of that time were much more focused on the question of whether balancing could provide a "scientifically disciplined" mode of reasoning for constitutional adjudication. While these differences are clearly only differences of degree, they seem important enough to demand a more nuanced, qualified assessment of the idea that Western constitutional systems are converging upon a shared idea of balancing.
I. WHAT BALANCING AND PROPORTIONALITY ARE
A. THE PROBLEMATIC DISCOURSE/PROCESS ASSIMILATION
BALANCING'S ANALYTICAL AND DISCURSIVE DIMENSIONS
From its very beginnings, the study of balancing has been the study of an analytical construct. In the early twentieth century, legal scholars in Western Europe and North America saw balancing as a "method" for deciding cases; as a heuristic device, a model for framing and resolving legal problems. In the U.S., for example, Roscoe Pound, the father of the school of "Sociological Jurisprudence"-the main propagators of balancing in early twentieth century America-saw balancing as a process of adjustment and calibration between opposing social interests.
8 His contemporary, Zechariah Chaffee, was one of the first commentators to advocate a method of balancing in the field of civil rights and liberties. 9 In Germany, scholars of the Interessenjurisprudenz-the jurisprudence of interests-movement of the first decades of the twentieth century consistently described balancing as a method of lawfinding. 10 And by mid-century, German constitutional lawyers were referring to balancing as a "process" that was being "carried out" by judges.
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This focus on what we might call the "analytics" of balancing continues to this day, and is pervasive with regard not only to balancing itself, but also with respect to "proportionality" and "proportionality balancing"-concepts often discussed in close connection with balancing. In modern studies, balancing is a "method of constitutional interpretation," 12 balancing and proportionality are "doctrines" relying on certain similar "thought processes,"
13 "proportionality balancing" is an "analytical procedure" and a "technique of rights adjudication."
14 Even outside the immediate context of constitutional adjudication, balancing is still discussed in terms of analytical structure-as a method for establishing rational outcomes to conflicts between principles and values. 15 It is submitted, however, that despite their ultimate concern with issues of analytical structure, the actual methodological starting point for virtually all historical and contemporary investigations of balancing in fact lies elsewhere. It is found in balancing as a form of discourse. In a methodological move that generally remains unarticulated, virtually all studies of balancing seize upon the incidence of a particular form of legal language-the discourse of balancing and weighing or of proportions and relativity in the case of proportionality-as the manifestation of an underlying form of activity-an analytical practice conceptualized as a process of weighing conflicting interests, values or principles. In these studies, what initially makes a balancing opinion a "balancing opinion," or what characterizes a balancing court as a "balancing court," is the occurrence of a peculiar form of legal language; an explicit reference to balancing or weighing. 16 The dominant approaches to the study of balancing and proportionality, then, may be characterized by two broad commonalities of method: (1) an initial assumption that the discourse of balancing will always signal a particular underlying analytical process; and (2) a subsequent assumption that what matters about the language of balancing is this underlying analytical process. Together, these two assumptions will be referred to here as "the discourse/process assimilation." Balancing references are taken as reliable indicators of the presence of an underlying analytical process. Once they have served this role, scholarly attention quickly shifts to this purportedly underlying process itself and to its implications, for constitutional practice, theory and culture. Balancing's discursive dimension disappears from view.
This Article is part of a larger project that claims that this assimilation of discourse and process and the attendant neglect of balancing's discursive dimension are seriously problematic. The starting point for this project, described in more detail elsewhere, 17 is the realization, no doubt familiar to comparative lawyers, that the language of balancing might well mean very different things at different times and in different places.
This possibility of difference raises a host of fascinating questions. Could it be that the language of balancing might not always and everywhere code for the same underlying analytical process? Would it be possible that even if similar analytical processes are involved, they could come with fundamentally different meanings in different settings? And, most importantly, could it be that what we are witnessing is not a simple convergence of legal systems, a globalization of legal thought and practice, but a much more complex set of phenomena encompassing both fundamental similarities and profound differences?
The following sections offer first an overview of a number of practical problems that comparative research based on a discourse/process assimilation could run into, followed by a brief discussion of the theoretical groundings of this Article's opposition to such an assimilation. After that, an attempt is made to replace the discourse/process assimilation with an approach that focuses squarely on the discursive dimension of balancing.
BREAKING DOWN THE DISCOURSE/PROCESS ASSIMILATION: PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF COMPARATIVE METHOD
Perhaps the most effective way of mounting a challenge to the discourse/process assimilation as it is used in comparative studies of balancing is to give an idea of the sorts of practical problems that studies that rely on this assumption run into. Two broad categories of such problems are canvassed here: methodological questions relating to situations in which the incidence of an analytical process of balancing is not accompanied by the language of balancing, or vice versa, and questions as to the identification and interpretation of balancing references in legal discourse. First, in a comparative project based on the discourse/process assimilation, there is very little place for the possibility of the presence of identical or similar processes without the incidence of similar language. Most obviously, judges in a particular jurisdiction may very well be engaging in a thought process that, if asked, they would themselves describe as balancing or weighing when deciding cases, without ever using any of these terms in official judicial discourse. 18 Judges may be largely silent on their methodology-think of the typical French Cour de Cassation ruling. They might also invoke alternative terminology, such as "means/ends rationality," a "least restrictive means test," or approaches based on Optimierungoptimalization-or praktische Konkordanz-practical concordance.
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Generally speaking, comparativists relying on the process/discourse assimilation would not include such samples in their studies of balancing, especially not when the terms used by the foreign judges and commentators are either unfamiliar in the their home jurisdictions or, if they are known, signify heuristic processes not seen as sufficiently closely related to balancing as understood there. This even though it might well be that judges and observers in the foreign jurisdiction using terms like "means/ends rationality" might themselves argue that analytically they are carrying out a process akin to balancing.
And the situation is even more complex than this. Think of observations such as those found in German academic literature, that the Federal Constitutional Court arrived at its decision in a particular case ohne eigentliche Or even extra-judicially. The tradition of judges giving extra-judicial accounts of their work, while not exclusively an Anglo-American phenomenon (see, e.g., the work of judge, and professor, Aharon Barak), is certainly not prevalent everywhere. 19 It is impossible a priori for a comparativist to exclude either the possibility that local legal actors are using these terms as real alternatives to the language of balancing, or that they understand such terms to have a meaning that is fundamentally different from balancing. In fact, the comparativist does not even know beforehand whether the question on the relationship between these terms and balancing is even a live issue for the legal system in question.
"without any real balancing." 20 Or of references in U.S. literature to a Supreme Court justice who is "a balancer who seldom uses the word." 21 Both of these types of observation, while clearly relating to an underlying concept of a process of balancing are only intelligible to comparativists if they take the discourse of balancing seriously, as a separate object of investigation. In the first scenario, an analysis of the role of a concept of balancing as an analytical process in German constitutional law would have identified the particular decision of the Constitutional Court as relevant on the basis of the balancing language in the Court's opinion, even though for at least some local observers the case was not a "true" balancing case. In the second scenario, the same comparativist would probably have missed the opinions of this particular justice, even though, again for many local observers, they formed part of the balancing canon within their legal system. The key to understanding either observation, as is argued below, is to abandon the assumptions underlying the discourse/process assimilation; to take the discourse of balancing as the primary object of study and to investigate what sorts of ideas, processes, and concepts this discourse is understood to refer to within a particular setting.
A second problem stems from the following. References to balancing generally encompass more than a simple mention of the word "weighing" or "balancing." Courts and commentators normally also identify additional elements, such as the parameters to be weighed (interests, values, etc.) and the way in which this weighing process should be carried out (ad hoc, systematically, etc.). From the viewpoint of comparative method, what is crucial is that it is not possible a priori to conclude that a finding of similarity relating to the terms "balancing" or "weighing," is more significant for an understanding of the relevant legal systems, than any differences found with regard to other "elements" of the balancing reference in a broad sense. In other words: it is not clear what, from a comparative legal studies perspective, the relative significance is of a finding of similarity in references to balancing between legal discourses in two settings, as compared to-inevitablesurrounding findings of difference. For example, where a court in one jurisdiction speaks of a principle of proportionality (Germany) and a court in another setting of a proportionality test (U.S.), there is a distinct possibility that the difference between principle and test says more about these two legal systems than the two invocations of an idea of proportionality. Similarly, in the German context, in references to Interessenabwägung (balancing of interests) and Wertabwägung or 'Güterabwägung (balancing of values) the differences in the chosen parametersvalues vs. interests-may be more significant than the invocation of balancing.
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This point may be illustrated through a short historical excursion. 23 As the editors of this volume, Iddo Porat & Moshe Cohen-Eliya write in their paper on "American Balancing and German Proportionality," a key phase in the development of balancing in the U.S. was the work of the "Sociological Jurisprudence" in the early decades of the twentieth century, in particular of Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School. 24 On a closer reading, however, it seems likely that when Pound propagated a method of a "balancing of interests," he was much more interested in promoting reliance on interests-especially social interests-in legal methodology, than in any specific idea of balancing or weighing. Pound's papers contain little or no helpful guidance for judges on how to balance. 25 Much more important for him was his project of drawing attention to the multitude of important social interests and to their neglected weight in contemporary case law; Pound's goal was the elaboration of "adequate schemes of public policies," as he had put it, not a constructive contribution to judicial method. 26 As Edmond Cahn remarked in the 1940s, "[O]nce the interests are listed, labelled, classified, and illustrated, Pound and his school seem ready to adjourn. … In short, the Anglo-Saxon school stands halted at the threshold of the theory of values (axiology)."
27 Meanwhile in Germany, however, the preoccupation of Pound's contemporaries of the Interessenjurisprudenz school-discussed below-"was less with listing and taxonomy and more with the techniques of adjudication."
28 Again, the comparativist is faced with very similar language referring to fundamentally different underlying ideas-balancing as ancillary to elaborate schemes of interests (in Pound's Sociological Jurisprudence), and balancing as a foundational technique of adjudication (in the German Interes senjurisprudenz). And again, it is suggested below that the solution, when faced with this possibility of difference, is to abandon the working assumptions of the discourse/process assimilation and to approach the study of balancing as a study of discourse. 22 Again, it may be that in the comparative scholar's home jurisdiction no meaningful distinction is made between the concepts of values and interests or that this distinction has another meaning than in the foreign jurisdiction being studied. 23 A more extended discussion of Pound's work can be found below, in Section II. 24 Cohen-Eliya, Porat, supra note 7. 25 See, e.g., Pound, supra note 8, at 35 (calling for "a reasoned weighing of the interests involved and a reasoned attempt to reconcile them or adjust them"). 26 Id. 
BALANCING AND "FUNCTIONALISM" IN COMPARATIVE LAW
A focus on balancing as an analytical process fits well with the traditionally dominant functionalist approach to comparative law. 29 Functionalist approaches are built on the idea that different legal systems all face a set of similar problems. Using these problems as constants, comparativists working in the functionalist tradition are interested in the range of solutions different legal systems have come up with. Balancing and proportionality in constitutional adjudication, from a functionalist perspective, would be such solutions, for example to the problem of limiting and adjusting constitutional rights protection. The task of the comparative lawyer would be to find out how exactly these specific solutions work. This, in turn, usually means finding out how the distinctive analytical structure of balancing or proportionality as doctrines contributes to solving the problem at hand.
Functionalist approaches have come under attack for a number of reasons.
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Two of these stand out in the context of balancing and proportionality. First, there is the danger that both in framing supposedly universal problems and in interpreting balancing or proportionality as particular solutions to these problems, lawyers looking at foreign legal systems might in fact largely be projecting experiences from within their own legal culture. If balancing "at home" is a technical legal doctrine with particular characteristics, there is a risk that balancing abroad will also be seen in such terms, even though the actors within the foreign legal system might not recognize such an understanding. Second, contemporary theories of comparative method raise the possibility that studying balancing or proportionality as merely the doctrinal or theoretical solution to a given common problem-even if we could come to a satisfactory definition of this problem-risks missing what may well be most significant about these phenomena as features of a particular legal system.
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B. TAKING BALANCING AS DISCOURSE SERIOUSLY
The problems listed above suggest that a rethinking of the nature of balancing as an object of study within comparative law could be beneficial. This section offers a short outline of what a replacement method might look like. 29 For an extended discussion see Bomhoff, supra note 3. . 31 See Bomhoff, supra note 3.
BALANCING AS ARGUMENT
References to balancing, in judicial opinions or academic legal writing, figure in a context of legal argumentation. Judges and writers-lawyers, in short-referring to balancing or weighing do so in order to argue for or against a particular legal position, a specific exercise of public authority or a certain understanding of the role of law and courts in society. The most basic answer to the question of "what balancing is," therefore, must be: "a feature of legal argumentation." The same holds for proportionality. This Article proposes that, to a greater extent than is currently common, comparative investigations of balancing and proportionality in constitutional law should engage directly with this quality of balancing as argument.
In the context of adjudication, especially in constitutional law, this approach can rely on two basic premises. First, courts in liberal democracies should, in principle, as public authorities, offer publicly stated reasons for their decisions whenever they exercise power in order to settle social, political, or moral controversies. Some form of publicly stated argumentation, in other words, is a necessary condition for the legitimacy of judicial rulings. 32 Second, in modern Western legal systems, legal actors understand themselves to have some degree of choice between different kinds of legal argument that are all potentially available, when defending or challenging these exercises of public authority. ) and Herbert Hart's classic statement in THE CONCEPT OF LAW 205 (1961) (calling attention to "the concern to deploy some acceptable general principle as a reasoned basis for decision" that could make decisions "acceptable as the reasoned product of informed impartial choice"). 33 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 67 (1997) ("As the [U.S.] Supreme Court confronts the task of shaping constitutional doctrine, many kinds of test are available to it"). In the German context, see, e.g., Gerd Roellecke, Prinzipien der Verfassungsinterpretation, in BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT UND GRUNDGESETZ II 23 (Christian Starck ed., 1976) (claiming that the range of ways by which legal positions may be supported is "prinzipiell unendlich"-in principle without limits). The question to what extent actors within the relevant system do indeed perceive a possibility of choice may itself show variations across systems and cultures.
These two premises provide a "minimally functionalist" framework for a comparative, cultural investigation of the discourse of balancing in constitutional law. All that is needed for this approach to work is a minimal, "thin" assumption that the discourse of balancing will, in all systems of constitutional adjudication, be expected to make some contribution to the legitimization of the exercise of judicial power. The great advantage of this perspective is that the nature of that contribution-the ways in which balancing is taken to be relevant, its success or failure as a legitimizing argument, etc.-can be left open as a question for comparative lawyers to answer. Rather than having to identify a specific function for balancing or proportionality as doctrine beforehand, and rather than having to adhere to a narrow reading of the foreign legal system's use of balancing as a solution to a specific problem, comparative studies focusing on the legitimizing contribution of balancing as argument can adopt an open perspective that leaves as much scope as possible to the foreign legal context.
THE "LOCAL MEANING" OF BALANCING AS ARGUMENT
Focusing directly on the language of balancing, then, the minimally functionalist approach should aim to uncover the ways in which this specific pattern of discourse creates meaning within the foreign legal culture. Just like in ordinary language, we can expect this meaning to be governed by the rules, or the "grammar," of legal discourse prevalent locally. 34 The assumption is that by uncovering relevant parts of this local grammar-such as the range of alternative argument forms available, the criteria used for the evaluation of arguments, and typical forms of debate that these arguments are used in-we may be able to establish what role balancing references play in the local context of legal argumentation. The relative force accorded to balancing references as legal arguments-the relative contribution they are understood to make to either the legitimization or the critique of the exercise of judicial power-can, in this way, be seen as a central component of what will be called here balancing's "local meaning." In this model, balancing's meaning will always be relative to its argumentative context; a context made-up out of elements such as alternative arguments, locally prevalent criteria for what constitutes sound legal reasoning, and historical developments with regard to these criteria and argument forms. It is the relationship between balancing references and this argumentative context that gives balancing meaning. 36 It may be useful to sum up the argument with regard to the method proposed. Explicit references to balancing are elements of legal language, or discourse. Within this discourse, these references serve as arguments to either support or critique the exercise of judicial power in constitutional adjudication. The task for comparative lawyers is to try to find out in what ways-and with what degree of success-balancing or proportionality references are able to fulfill this role within different legal systems. This means assessing what the language of balancing or proportionality means to the relevant participants; the judges and their audience in the foreign legal system. This "local meaning" of balancing or proportionality in the foreign legal system may then be compared to the local meaning of balancing or proportionality elsewhere.
BALANCING'S DISCURSIVE CONTEXTS
Because judges generally have a choice as to the arguments they use to support their decisions, the meaning of any individual legal argument will always be relative to that of other elements of legal discourse. Engaging with balancing and proportionality as legal arguments, then means engaging with their discursive context, their surroundings as legal argument. An illuminating application of such an approach to legal argument can be found in Cass Sunstein's study of analogical reasoning in the U.S. 37 In his article "On Analogical Reasoning," Sunstein proposes "to try to get a better sense of analogical reasoning by comparing it with five other forms of reasoning that have a prominent place in law."
38 Sunstein places analogical reasoning alongside alternative forms of argument, such as argument by "classification," or "means-ends rationality" that he finds are "pervasive" locally.
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His description and evaluation of reasoning by analogy, ultimately, proceeds on the basis of this comparison: analogical reasoning is, for example, comparatively 36 Cf. Jack M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, at 7 n.11 (1986 The remainder of this section offers a very brief presentation of how a comparative project on balancing in Continental Europe and the U.S. might use a similar approach. It is suggested that the three key factors for comparativists to take into account would be: (1) the range of locally dominant alternative arguments; (2) the locally prevalent criteria for the evaluation of legal argument; and (3) any historical developments in these criteria and in commonly used forms of legal reasoning.
i. DOMINANT ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENTS
Balancing's local significance will be relative to that of locally prevalent alternative forms of argument. Both descriptively and normatively, balancing's characteristicsits strengths and weaknesses as legal argument-will be assessed not in the abstract, but through a comparison with these locally prevalent alternatives. A comparative U.S./Continental Europe project on balancing will therefore have to take account of the differences between the traditionally dominant argument forms in these two settings.
There is substantial support for the observation that reasoning by analogy occupies a prime position in Anglo-American legal thought and that syllogistic reasoning is much more central to the Continental European tradition. 41 This means that it can be hypothesized that the dimension "not subsumption" will be a more important part of balancing's local meaning on the continent, 42 whereas 40 Id. the dimension "not reasoning by analogy" might carry greater weight in the U.S. A similar, more nuanced, approach may be developed for other locally important alternative forms of argument. 43 ii. CRITERIA FOR THE EVALUATION OF LEGAL ARGUMENT Once the range of dominant alternatives for balancing has been identified,comparative scholars should look at the prevalent criteria by which the appropriateness of these arguments is assessed locally. If, for example, the advantages and drawbacks of the model of the syllogism are, in the Continental tradition, discussed in terms of formal rationality, then local legal actors may be expected to similarly evaluate balancing in these terms. 44 This criterion may, however, be largely irrelevant elsewhere. 45 If, on the other hand, in the U.S. local actors praise analogical reasoning's potential for "allow[ing] people who diverge on abstract principles to converge on particular outcomes," 46 or criticize this form of reasoning for being "often silent or unhelpful on the question of social consequences" of judicial decisions, 47 they are again likely to understand and evaluate balancing in similar terms. These dimensions may, conversely, remain largely out of focus in Continental Europe. The local meaning of balancing as argument, it is important to stress, is as much a function of the questions asked of legal argument in different systems, as it is of the answers given to these questions.
iii. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS
The meaning of all forms of legal reasoning in use today is relative to that of forms used in earlier periods, regardless of whether these older arguments are still available. There are clear indications that this particular dimension of comparison may be especially relevant for the topic of balancing, as the "rise of balancing" This claim, already controversial on the European continent, will be even less obviously appealing in an Anglo-American setting. 43 A detailed investigation of the "alternative arguments" approach is beyond the scope of this Article. I deal more extensively with the balancing/analogical reasoning and balancing/ syllogistic reasoning oppositions in forthcoming work within the project of which this Article forms part. 44 See for a more extensive discussion Bomhoff, supra note 3, at 574-75. 45 has often been identified as the prime manifestation of the transition to a new age in legal argumentation in the course of the twentieth century. We find an example of this form of comparison in Alexander Aleinikoff's famous study of the Age of Balancing in American constitutional law. Aleinikoff writes:
[B]alancing was a major break with the past, responding to the collapse of nineteenth century conceptualism and formalism as well as to half a century of intellectual and social change. … Flying the flags of pragmatism, instrumentalism and science, balancing represented one attempt by the judiciary to demonstrate that it could reject mechanical jurisprudence without rejecting the notion of law.
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The comparisons evident in such historical assessments offer a wealth of information on balancing's local meaning, in this case in the U.S. The rejected preceding forms of argument-here, those associated with conceptualism, formalism, and mechanical jurisprudence-fulfill a role similar to that of alternative arguments. Knowing that legal actors who use balancing language may be doing so, at least in part, to signal that they are trying to avoid "mechanical reasoning," gives a particular significance to that language and helps with its interpretation. Similarly, knowing that these actors associate balancing with pragmatism and instrumentalism, imbues balancing discourse with special meaning that may not be available elsewhere.
C. GENEALOGIES OF BALANCING IN GERMANY AND THE U.S.
The remainder of this Article takes up this third dimension of balancing's local meaning; its historical relativity, or the way in which preceding and continuing layers of legal culture make up part of what balancing signifies today. The premise for this investigation is that the meaning of balancing as argument can only be really understood from a genealogical perspective that traces its roots and any subsequent developments in its use as argument.
A broad historical overview of the development of balancing discourse in Germany and the U.S. over the course of the twentieth century shows that three distinct types of debates, or discursive contexts, have at various times been pervasive in each setting. First, between roughly 1900 and 1930, lawyers and judges in both the United States and in Europe began describing law and lawmaking generally in terms of balancing and weighing of interests. Second, in the course of the 1950s and early 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court and the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany) (BVerfG) began to use the language of balancing in the adjudication of specific fundamental rights cases. In both settings, the context for this development was principally the area of freedom of expression. Finally, during roughly the fourth quarter of the twentieth century, legal actors in both settings began to discuss the whole domain of constitutional rights adjudication in terms of balancing. 49 Due to limitations of space, the following sections look only at the first two of these settings, following the methodology set out above. 50 In each case, the goal is to get to grips with the way local actors of the relevant period understood invocations of balancing.
II. COMPARING INTERESSENJURISPRUDENZ & SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE A. THE ADVENT OF BALANCING: SIMILARITIES
In the first decades of the twentieth century, lawyers and judges in both the United States and in Europe began describing law and lawmaking in terms of balancing and weighing of interests. This new perspective arose out of a critique against apparently very similar orthodoxies: the formalism and conceptualism of classical legal thought in the U.S. and the Pandektenwissenschaft of Puchta and Windscheid and the Begriffsjurisprudenz-the jurisprudence of concepts-in private and public law in Germany. The balancing-based alternative was developed by François Gény and other juristes inquièts in France, 51 Philipp Heck and his fellow members of the school of Interessenjurisprudenz in Germany and Roscoe Pound and other "sociological jurisprudes" in the United States.
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The American side of these developments-the reaction against "Langdellian" formalist legal science and the formalism of the Lochner-era in constitutional law-has been exhaustively analyzed and is of continuing canonical importance for contemporary American constitutional thought. 53 German school of 'Interessenjurisprudenz,'"Albert Ehrenzweig wrote in his 1948 review of an English translation of the works of Philipp Heck and some of his contemporaries. 54 What little work that has been carried out, however, has long emphasized the similarities between developments in Europe and in the U.S. So, for example, in 1944, the legal theorist Wolfgang Friedmann observed a "strikingly similar development of an Interessenjurisprudenz by American lawyers against the background of a very different legal system." The theme of "balancing of interests" that Pound was to develop in the 1920s has to be seen fully in function of these ideas on social justice and his project of progressive reform. 59 On the one hand, the idea of balancing was to some extent the expression of the new worldview, already touched upon by Holmes that emphasized interdependence over absolutism and individualism. On the other hand, the concept of interests was instrumental in mediating between individual rights-that had always been judicially protected-and policies that had not. The concept of interests allowed for evaluation and comparison to be carried out "on the same plane." This it achieved primarily through a revaluation of the social and a corresponding relativization of the individual.
C. THE GERMAN JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERESTS AS A PURE THEORY OF METHOD
The German School of the Interessenjurisprudenz, a grouping of scholars including principally Philipp Heck, Ernst Stampe, Max Rümelin, Heinrich Stoll and Rudolf Müller-Erzbach, 60 has to be situated as an extension of Jhering's emphasis on teleology in legal method, and as a critique of both the classical orthodoxy of the Begriffsjurisprudenz and the contemporaneous, more radical critique of the Freirechtsschule. 61 The point of departure for the German Interessenjurisprudenz was the problem of "gap-filling" in law.
62 Ernst Stampe wrote in 1905 that against the "dogma of the gaplessness of the legal order" and its associated method of subsumption of facts under norms, the new critics proposed "sensible lawfinding by judges" through "social weighing" and "comparative valuation of colliding 59 It is significant in this respect that Pound's earlier writings, in particular his seminal articles Mechanical Jurisprudence (1908 and Liberty of Contract 1909), contain little or no reference to balancing of interests. 60 Out of this group of authors, Heck has clearly been the most influential. See, e.g., KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 49 (6th ed. 1991) (arguing that Heck's influence "can hardly be overestimated"). See also Cahn, supra note 27, at 921: "The chief German exponent of Interessenjurisprudenz is Philipp Heck." Heck's work is of particular interest for this Article's project because of the way in which his later (early 1930s) writings give an overview of the main lines in the development of the Interessenjurisprudenz. 61 See, e.g., HECK, supra note 10, at 108-09: "The fight against the Jurisprudence of Concepts is the starting point and one of the main contents of our doctrine" … "Our second front is directed against the theory of 'Free Law'". 62 See, e.g., Philipp Heck, Interessenjurisprudenz (1932 lecture, published in 1933 and translated in Schoch & Fuller eds., supra note 10, at 40 as The Jurisprudence of Interests: "the modern trend in legal thinking refuses to confine the judge to a mere cognitive function and rejects the method of filling gaps in the law by means of classificatory concepts" and "the … truth is that our laws are inadequate, incomplete, and sometimes contradictory"). interests." 63 Heck himself even defined Interessenjurisprudenz as "the methodical use of the analysis of interests in order to fill gaps in the law." 64 In order to distinguish his own project from Jhering's broader teleological revolution and to carve out a distinct place for the Interessenjurisprudenz, Heck made a distinction between what he called the "genetic theory of interests" (interests are at the basis of existing legal rules), that Jhering had already elaborated on and the "productive theory of interests" (actual use of analysis of interests in judicial lawfinding) that he thought was his own contribution. 65 For the Interessenjurisprudenz scholars, a crucial element of their new method was the affirmation of its strict philosophical and political neutrality. Heck wrote: "The method of the Jurisprudence of Interests derives its principles solely from the experience and needs of legal research. It is not based on any philosophy nor modeled after any of the other sciences. This is what I term 'juridical autonomy. '" 66 This assertion of neutrality, "juridical autonomy," is a dominant, recurrent theme in the writings of the Interessenjurisprudenz scholars. The Jurisprudence of Interests, was a "pure theory of method," "not a theory of substantive values," and "entirely independent of any ideology." 67 In this sense, the school of Interessenjurisprudenz remained clearly within the traditional European paradigm of "strictly juristic method." 68 As Philipp Heck wrote in 1932: "We do not dream of dictating to the legal community which interests it must protect in preference to others. We want to serve all the interests which the legal community holds worthy of protection at a given time." 69 This asserted neutrality assumed special significance in the context of the Rechtserneuerung (law reform) post-1933 under National-Socialism. Heck himself, for one, thought that his method would be ideally suited for the implementation of the new National-Socialist ideals in law. In a 1936 article "Die Interessenjurisprudenz und ihre neuen Gegner" ("The Jurisprudence of Interests and its New Enemies"), Heck wrote that his method was highly appropriate for the legal reform required by National-Socialism. 70 By 1936, however, the "Jurisprudence of Interests" had come under heavy fire from rival scholars-hence the defensive title of Heck's article. The main charge of critics such as Julius Binder was that of liberal individualism. 71 As Bernd Rüthers summarized in his famous post-war book Die unbegrenzte Auslegung (Boundless Interpretation), Heck's critics thought that "the representatives of the Jurisprudence of Interests would not, as children of the liberal thinking of the nineteenth century, be able to see the relationship between individual and collective interests in any other way than as in a conflict calling for an equalization." 72 The whole idea of individual interests as opposed to, or even just distinct from, social or collective interest was alien to the new ideology.
Mere insistence on the neutrality of his method could not save Heck as this neutrality itself was seen as "characteristic for a bygone era." 73 This is why in his 1936 article and in other writings of the period, Heck, although careful to maintain the separation between philosophy and legal method, did suggest that he had always seen individual interests as worthy of protection only because of the fact that they were simultaneously social interests. 74 This limited substantive adjustment, however, could not, much to Heck's own surprise, save his method from the criticism that his method was too liberal and too individualistic.
D. COMPARING BALANCING: ARGUMENT AND SUBSTANCE
From the perspective of balancing as discourse, described above, the central conclusion that follows from these short descriptions relates to the contingency of the relationship between legal method and substantive outcomes. In the U.S., the socially progressive sociological jurisprudence made a conscious effort to develop associations between legal method and politics; both in their critique of the Lochner's formalism and in their elaboration of balancing of interests as its replacement. Pound, the main early propagator of balancing of interests in America, had a conception of "judicial decision-making as part of [a] larger project of social engineering." 75 Balancing of interests became a progressive legal device, 76 used in the broader project of leveling between rights and social policies. Through the introduction of the concept of interests, the Progressives hoped to be able to devalue individual rights, that they thought had received excessive judicial protection, and to revalue social policy that they thought had been neglected. This historical understanding allows us to appreciate later American debates on balancing, in which it has been claimed both that use of balancing would inherently promote excessive judicial discretion and activism in rights protection, and that it would induce excessive deference and insufficient levels of protection for rights.
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Understanding balancing as having inherently political characteristics has always, to a certain degree, been natural in the U.S. Its main original propagators invoked balancing precisely for political reasons.
Balancing of interests was not seen in this light by its German propagators. Philipp Heck settled on the concept of interests merely because he thought it permitted the finest conceptual distinctions in legal analysis, not because he wanted to de-or revalue any side of any equation. 78 In stark contrast with Roscoe Pound's social-progressive use of the method in the U.S., Heck and the other members of the School of Interessenjurisprudenz were even charged with promoting excessive individualism through their use of balancing of interests. Heck and other writers in Europe invoked balancing of interests because they wanted law and legal methodology to offer a closer, more accurate reflection of society. None of them seemed particularly interested in using balancing to actually change that society.
This connection between balancing and instrumentality in the U.S.-and the absence of such a connection in the work of the German Interessenjurisprudenz-scholars-has had an enormous lasting influence on later understandings of balancing. References to balancing, in the U.S., have, from the outset, been understood as references to judicial policy and to specific-though changeable-socio-political goals. Such references, therefore, function very differently as legal arguments in the American context than on the European Continent. 77 For an overview of such debates (and an argument against either assertion), see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293 (1992) . 78 See, e.g., HECK, supra note 10, at 108 ("Through the introduction and development of the interest concepts, ... the legal material is more finely dissected and subdivided" 81 One of the topics German scholars showed particular interest in was American freedom of expression law. Not only were individual Supreme Court decisions on free speech regularly commented upon in German journals, 82 German authors also were intimately familiar with the main general doctrinal constructs that featured in First Amendment law, such as the "bad tendency test," 83 the "preferred freedoms doctrine," and, especially, the "clear and present danger test" (clear-and-present-danger-Klausel or -Formel).
Within this general topic of freedom of expression, German authors were especially interested in the use of balancing by the Supreme Court in its First Amendment decisions of the late 1950s and early 1960s.
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Take for example the lectures by Ulrich Scheuner and Roman Schnur on freedom of the press at the 1963 Annual Assembly of the Association of German Constitutional Law Scholars. 86 When he discussed the German Constitutional Court's "new" approach of Wertabwägung-balancing of values-in the seminal Lüth decision, Scheuner was quick to point out that "this method of balancing … is also used in America," referring to balancing references in opinions by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan. 87 In a second contribution, Roman Schnur, a critic of the German Constitutional Court's approach to Article 5 of the German Basic Law, 88 expressed bewilderment at the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court would give up its "by now sufficiently concretized clear-and-present-danger test in favor of a balancing of interests that can be manipulated at will." 89 
B. THE SEARCH FOR DIFFERENCE: AMERICAN BALANCING AND "BALANCING AWAY"
Again, this background of an emphasis on similarities makes it especially interesting to look at potential differences, and again we can take Cohen-Eliya & Porat's account as a starting point. The authors are concerned with showing that balancing in U.S. constitutional rights adjudication, from the outset, was heavily criticized. 91 Following closely upon the association between balancing and (progressive) politics described earlier, these early postwar critiques of constitutional balancing focused, to a very large extent, on perceived connections between balancing as a method and the substantive outcomes of constitutional rights litigation.
A central theme running through early post-War American discussions of balancing is the almost automatic connection made between balancing and balancing away; between weighing civil liberties and allowing them to be outweighed. Justice Black's evocative imagery of civil liberties being "weighed out of the Constitution," 92 formed the foundation for an intellectual tradition of associating balancing with diminished protection for constitutional rights. "'[B]alancing', or even worse 'ad hoc balancing,' still carries a bad odor," Frederick Schauer wrote at the end of the 1990s. 93 This lasting connection, Schauer argues, is at least partially a legacy of the debates of the 1950's and 1960's, in which "balancing," especially as championed by Justice Frankfurter, was associated with a tendency to take the substance of governmental justification for restricting speech quite seriously and with a tendency to defer to the government's own determinations of the weight of those justifications. 94 However hard proponents of balancing might argue that "balancing away" was not a necessity and that rights could, for example, just as easily be "defined away," the "alignment between balancing with scantier free speech protection" has remained strong. 95 Contemporary American critics of balancing framed the connection between method and substance in a number of different ways. First, balancing was criticized for eroding the meaning of the First Amendment. Balancing in freedom of expression cases, it was argued, violated the "genius of a written Constitution," 96 and gave "no real meaning to the [F]irst [A]mendment." 97 The balancing test abandoned the constitutional text so completely, that it assured "little, if any, more freedom of speech than [would have been the case] if the First Amendment had never been adopted." 98 In this way, the use of balancing, its most strident critics claimed, put "the whole idea of a government of limited powers, and of a written constitution" at risk. 99 Second, contemporary commentators often criticized balancing on the ground that it did not offer any firm boundaries to permissible governmental action. An example of these views is Charles Reich's defense of Justice Black's position: "[T]he Court's ad hoc balances are on a 'slippery slope'. Each is likely to reflect present-day needs and views. … The urgencies of the day, like gravity, pull the Court along; there is no counterweight in its formula to maintain a constant level." 100 And finally, the Supreme Court's balancing test was criticized for inducing an excessive degree of deference toward the legislative branch and its determination of the appropriate scope for freedom of expression. "As applied to date," Thomas Emerson concluded in 1963 after a spate of balancing opinions in First Amendment cases, "the test gives almost conclusive weight to the legislative judgment." cases involving unpopular speakers-Douds, Dennis, Barenblatt, Konigsberg-all upheld governmental limitations on free speech. 103 
C. GERMAN BALANCING AND THE STANDARDS FOR A LEGAL METHOD
While balancing very quickly assumed an absolutely central status in German constitutional law in a way not replicated in the U.S., it would be misleading to suggest that this ascendancy was not subject to any criticism. A crucial difference between balancing discourse in Germany and the U.S. of this period, rather, lies in the kind of criticism leveled against balancing. Just in the way that American critiques of the 1960s have to be read in conjunction with debates on balancing's instrumentality of the 1920s and 1930s, so too must German balancing critiques of the 1960s be seen in light of earlier German debates on balancing's qualities as a "scientific" legal method.
The prime focus of these German critiques was balancing's alleged irrationality; its failure to live up to the standards of rationality set for legal argument generally. The next paragraphs discuss two of main strands in these critiques, distinguishing between: (1) attacks on balancing's rationality, and (2) on its unscientific nature.
104 Both these lines of criticism are of great interest to any study of the local evaluation of balancing as legal argument.
BALANCING'S DEFICIENCIES AS A "LEGAL METHOD": RATIONALITY
The most influential early critique of the Constitutional Court's general approach to adjudication under the Bonn Constitution came from Ernst Forsthoff. 105 In a series of articles that appeared in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Forsthoff, at the time one of Germany's leading constitutional and administrative law scholars, warned that the methods of the German Constitutional Court put the constitutional order in danger of dissolution, or even Auflösung (decomposition). 106 In Forsthoff's view, the Court's approach based on "value analysis and value balancing" was no longer juristische Methode (a legal method) but had to be located within geisteswissenschaftliche Methode (the realm of the humanities) 107 In an oft-quoted admonition, Forsthoff wrote "legal science destroys itself when it does not adhere stringently to the position that legal interpretation is the determination of the correct deduction in the sense of syllogistic reasoning." 108 An understanding of the German Basic Law as a value system would replace "logical, replicable procedures of the application of law" by "valuations which are only comprehensible from the mentality of the appraiser." 109 Therefore, by pursuing a geisteswissenschaftliche approach, including Wertabwägung, instead of the traditional rules of interpretation, the Court put philosophy and Standesideologie (its own ideology) in the place of law and legal method, leading to a potentially devastating loss of legal rationality. 110 Forsthoff's theses formed the object of heated discussion in the course of the 1960s. 111 It seems that, although many commentators thought that the remedies Forsthoff proposed for the ills he observed-a return to the classical Savignian rules of interpretation 112 -were anachronistic and impracticable, 113 most were inclined to agree at least in part with his general diagnosis. 114 Forsthoff's call for methodologically pure, disciplined thinking in legal theory and adjudication certainly struck a chord with many of his contemporaries. 115 For us, his contributions are particularly relevant as an example, on a high level of abstraction, of efforts to cast balancing as empty, or outside the realm of the legal, and therefore illegitimate as such, in all its manifestations, for the German Constitutional Court to engage in.
A similar attack on balancing's rationality as a mode of argument is contained in Friedrich Müller's 1966 book Normstruktur und Normativität. In Müller's view, the idea of balancing was hermeneutisch fragwürdig (hermeneutically questionable). 116 In the absence of guidelines as to how competing goods could be "rationally identified and valuated in a replicable, truly inter-subjectively debatable way," 117 a balancing decision could hardly amount to more than a mere proposition. 118 Balancing on this view, and because of its irrational character, cannot fulfill the rechtstaatliche Begründungszwang-the fundamental duty for courts to justify their decisions. 119 
BALANCING'S DEFICIENCIES AS LEGAL METHOD: SCIENTIFIC CHARACTER
A second main current in the literature accepted the idea that balancing could in principle have a legitimate place as a mode of argument within constitutional adjudication but criticized the modalities of the BVerfG's specific approach, in particular in its freedom of expression cases. A number of commentators criticized the Court for leaving its balancing test unstructured, inconsistent, and unclear in its actual operation. The background to these critiques is an acknowledgment-or even an enthusiastic embrace-of the idea that explicit balancing is going to remain a fixture of the Court's practice and a recognition that the task of constitutional scholarship should therefore be to help improve the Court's methods.
These critiques are interesting primarily for two points; for what they say about how constitutional scholars viewed their own relationship to the Court, and for the content of the actual proposals. With regard to the first issue: a pervasive, double sided theme within the relevant debates of the 1960s can be captured in the twin ideas that (a) a form of malaise in the scholarship of constitutional interpretation was, at least partly, to blame for defects in the Court's approach, and (b) improvement in scholarly work on constitutional interpretation could make a real contribution toward better decisions. The weaknesses in the Court's balancing approach were understandable, wrote Friedrich Müller in 1966. After all, theoreticians had not given the courts sufficient guidance. 120 What was needed was hermeneutische Präzisierung-hermeneutical clarification and sharpening-to be offered, of course, by academics. 121 These two convictions help explain why many authors asked for their contributions to be understood "not as criticism of the Court, but as a call to persevere in efforts to create a consistent, convincing constitutional dogmatics-'Verfassungsdogmatik.'" 122 The quest, to be led by scholars, is to develop methods of interpretation that are theoretically-scientifically secure. 123 This conception puts a gloss on the contributions of scholars intended to discipline or structure the BVerfG's balancing approach in that it implicitly accepts the standards of juristischer Wissenschaftlichkeit (juridical science) as decisively relevant to the evaluation of the Court's work.
D. COMPARING BALANCING: METHOD AND POLITICS
A detailed comprehensive comparison of balancing in early postwar constitutional rights adjudication in Germany and U.S. would require a vastly longer analysis than is possible within the context of this Article. Nevertheless some observations can be offered on the basis of these sketches. While many themes of critique can be found in both settings, and all differences will therefore have to be matters of degree, it does seem that there are important differences in emphasis and in style. So, while we can find acknowledgement of the political nature of constitutional adjudication in both Germany and the U.S. during the late 1950s and early 1960s, this acknowledgement went much further and had a much greater impact on mainstream legal culture in the U.S. And while constructive efforts by academics to offer "friendly advice" on the methods of constitutional adjudication can be found in both Germany and the U.S., this practice seems to have been much more pervasive in Germany. 124 Given these differences in emphasis, it is possible to describe at least the broad contours of what a typical German or American (United States) critique of balancing looks like. A typical German critique of balancing does not discuss the outcomes of individual cases and pays little attention to what the use of balancing does to the institutional position of courts. Such a typical critique does, however, talk about balancing's shortcomings as a scientifically controlled method for deciding cases. A typical American critique of balancing does look at the outcomes of cases and does focus on the institutional position of courts. Such a critique claims that use of balancing cannot help the courts fulfill their proper role because it is too indeterminate, too legislative-like or too dangerous for the protection of individual rights.
It is in the details of the discourse of balancing, finally, that we find subtle hints to confirm these images of typical critiques. From a discourse-oriented perspective, it is significant that such an important German term of art as Methodenlehre is virtually untranslatable into English, or, conversely, that a term like "slippery slope," central to the American discourse of balancing, has no obvious German equivalent. It also seems important that the dominant alternative to balancing as understood in the U.S. is described as definition or categorization; two terms that implicitly emphasize an active role for deciders (judges) and that focus on predictability, and on keeping constitutional matters, literally, within boundaries. In the German setting, conversely, the dominant alternative to balancing is the syllogism; a term which, while containing very similar elements to definition, does offer a different emphasis, presenting a reduced role for deciders and an emphasis on pure logics of reasoning.
IV. CONCLUSION
Overlooking almost a century of balancing discourse in Germany and the U.S., what stands out is not merely the differences between these two settings, but especially the historical continuity in those differences. Put colloquially: U.S. discussions of balancing in the 1930s look much more like U.S. debates of the 50s-or even the 90s-than they look like German debates on balancing from any of these periods and vice versa. From the earliest references to balancing all the way up to the contemporary work of scholars like Robert Alexy, German authors have been concerned with exploring the possibilities of a scientific and rational balancing method. When they have criticized the courts, they have done so overwhelmingly on methodological grounds, in a spirit of scientific advice and cooperation. Even those most critical of the BVerfG's turn toward balancing in the late 1950s, early 1960s, almost never took issue with the specific outcomes of its case law or accused the Court of manipulating doctrine to achieve certain results. 125 In the U.S., on the other hand, balancing was introduced, in part, to serve political purposes from the outset. In the understanding of the relevant local legal actors, this association between balancing as method and balancing as politics has never gone away.
From a perspective focused on the local meaning of the language of balancing, both these kinds of tenacious perceptions are critical. What matters for balancing's role as a legal argument is whether local actors think it might be a rational form of justifying decisions; what sorts of rationality criteria they have in mind, and whether they are interested in trying to help courts figure out how to improve balancing-based reasoning (and in what ways). Similarly, what is crucial for balancing's role as a legal argument is whether local actors perceive a connection between method and substance, whether they view balancing as insufficiently protective of rights, or overly intrusive on governmental policies. More than a 100 years after the first invocations of balancing in jurisprudence, and 50 years after the first references to balancing in constitutional rights adjudication, it may well be that we are only beginning to uncover the rich variety of shades and nuances in balancing's local meaning. 125 A thorough analysis of why this might have been so is beyond the scope of this Article. One relevant factor may have been the fact that many of the German Constitutional Court's important early balancing decisions concerned "horizontal" type cases (originating in controversies between individuals) and that, although implicating very sensitive topics such as the threat of Communism and the legacy of Nazism, they did not necessitate any direct confrontation between the Court and the other branches of government.
